Mekelle/Tel Aviv/Nairobi/Pretoria/London

The Three Rings of American Power and the TPLF’s Strategic Blind Spot**
HAGR – Geopolitical Research Division

Executive Summary

Over three decades, U.S. foreign policy toward Ethiopia and Tigray has operated through three concentric layers of strategic interest: regional stability, political balance, and global competition. While these “three rings” were rarely stated explicitly, they shaped Washington’s decisions during key turning points—from the 1991 transition to the TDF advance toward Addis Ababa in 2021.

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), once a dominant force in Ethiopia’s political landscape, consistently misinterpreted these guiding principles. This misunderstanding contributed to its loss of federal power in 2018, limited its military options in 2021, and ultimately influenced the political and humanitarian trajectory of Tigray during the 2020–2022 conflict.

This analysis outlines the three rings, traces their historical application, and examines how TPLF’s strategic misreading of American policy exposed Tigray to profound risks.

I. The Three Rings of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa

Ring One: The Security–Stability Mandate

Washington’s foremost priority in the Horn of Africa is stability. U.S. policymakers view Ethiopia as a linchpin state whose collapse could unleash regional instability across East Africa and the Red Sea Corridor. From the U.S. perspective, internal Ethiopian politics are secondary to the broader question:

Who can maintain Ethiopia’s territorial cohesion and ensure the region does not destabilize?

This principle shaped several pivotal decisions:

• The United States supported EPRDF/TPLF’s rise in 1991, viewing it as the most capable force to stabilize Ethiopia after the Derg.
• By 2018, Washington concluded that a political transition led by Abiy Ahmed could produce broader stability, and U.S. backing shifted accordingly.
• In 2021, U.S. officials opposed both TPLF’s advance toward Addis Ababa and the federal government’s militarized retaliation, insisting that either scenario threatened regional collapse.

Stability—not loyalty to individual actors—remains the primary determinant of Washington’s response.

Ring Two: The Political Order Mandate

A second layer of U.S. policy opposes any political monopoly within Ethiopia. Washington has long held that Ethiopia’s size, ethnic diversity, and fragile federal structure require an inclusive political balance.

This principle influenced:

• U.S. pressure on the EPRDF/TPLF coalition after 1991 to accommodate broader federal power-sharing.
• The cooling of relations with TPLF as concerns rose over authoritarian governance, human-rights abuses, and entrenched dominance.
• Strong U.S. objections in 2021 to TPLF entering Addis Ababa, an outcome Washington believed would trigger state fragmentation and multi-front conflict.

For U.S. policymakers, preventing one group from monopolizing Ethiopian politics is essential to maintaining long-term stability.

Ring Three: The Great Power Competition Mandate

The third ring reflects evolving global dynamics, especially after 2008 and increasingly after 2016. It includes:

• U.S.–China competition over infrastructure, military access, and regional influence.
• Intensifying militarization of the Red Sea by Gulf states, Turkey, and Iran.
• Growing concerns over Eritrea’s partnerships with Russia and China.
• The need for a predictable, Western-aligned Ethiopia in an increasingly contested region.

By the late 2010s, Washington viewed TPLF as out of step with this new strategic landscape—too rigid, too inward-looking, and ill-prepared for the geopolitical realignments shaping the Horn.

II. Historical Evidence: The Rings at Work (1991–2021)

1. The 1991 Capture of Addis Ababa

EPRDF/TPLF forces entered Addis Ababa with tacit U.S. approval. Washington regarded them as the only movement capable of stabilizing Ethiopia after the Derg’s collapse. The episode remains the clearest example of the Stability Mandate (Ring One) in practice.

2. The 2018 Political Transition

TPLF’s removal from federal leadership occurred amid U.S. pressure for reform and growing international concerns over governance, repression, and internal fragmentation. Washington’s support for Abiy Ahmed’s rise reflected both Ring One (stability) and Ring Two (political balance).

3. The TDF Advance Toward Addis Ababa (2021)

In late 2021, Tigrayan forces captured key towns and advanced toward the capital. Although a military route was open, U.S. diplomatic messaging made it clear that a TPLF takeover of Addis Ababa was unacceptable.

American officials repeatedly warned that such an outcome could lead to state collapse, wider regional war, and intensified global competition—an intersection of Rings One and Two.

The advance halted not through military defeat but through geopolitical constraint.

III. TPLF’s Strategic Blind Spot

1. Misinterpreting Its Relationship With Washington

TPLF often believed it held a special strategic relationship with the United States due to cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s. In reality, U.S. engagement was pragmatic. Once Washington assessed that TPLF no longer contributed to stability, the relationship shifted.

2. Failing to Recognize American Red Lines

TPLF leaders underestimated U.S. opposition to:

• political monopolies,
• militarized governance,
• actions that could destabilize Ethiopia’s federal structure, and
• regional alignments that threatened U.S. strategic interests.

These misunderstandings shaped several missteps in the years leading up to the 2020–2022 war.

3. Outdated Strategic Thinking

A segment of TPLF’s senior leadership—political and military figures rooted in the liberation-era command structure—maintained a worldview shaped by the regional dynamics of the 1980s and 1990s.
This approach did not adapt to:

• the rise of China,
• Gulf states’ expanding influence,
• the Red Sea’s militarization,
• shifts in U.S. foreign-policy priorities.

This disconnect left TPLF ill-equipped to navigate the international response during the conflict.

IV. Consequences for Tigray

The geopolitical miscalculations of TPLF’s leadership had far-reaching effects:

• Tigray entered a devastating war with limited diplomatic support.
• Tigrayan forces faced strategic constraints due to international opposition.
• Regional alliances weakened, leaving Tigray increasingly isolated.
• Humanitarian access, negotiation leverage, and post-war political positioning were significantly compromised.

The humanitarian burden fell most heavily on civilians—underscoring the cost of misreading U.S. strategic priorities.

V. Implications for Tigray’s Future Political Landscape

Analysts argue that future Tigrayan leaders will need to demonstrate a deeper understanding of global geopolitics. The experience of 2020–2022 highlighted that:

• No regional actor can shape Ethiopia’s political future without navigating U.S. strategic boundaries.
• Military dominance cannot substitute for diplomatic legitimacy.
• Regional and global power shifts must be integrated into political planning.
• Fragmented or militarized leadership structures are unsustainable in a contested geopolitical environment.

Avoiding the pitfalls of past leadership requires modernized political strategies grounded in international realities.

Conclusion

The Horn of Africa sits at the intersection of regional instability, rising global competition, and growing geopolitical interest in the Red Sea corridor. U.S. foreign policy toward Ethiopia and Tigray operates through three interconnected rings—stability, political balance, and great-power rivalry.
For decades, these layers shaped outcomes in the region, often in ways that were not immediately visible to local actors.

TPLF’s inability to read these strategic signals contributed to its political decline and shaped the trajectory of Tigray during the recent conflict. As the region continues to evolve, Tigray’s future leadership will need to navigate these global dynamics with greater sophistication, prioritizing diplomacy, strategic literacy, and geopolitical awareness.

Only through such an approach can Tigray position itself effectively within the shifting landscape of the Horn of Africa.