Mekelle/Tel Aviv/Nairobi/Pretoria/London
Gold, Guns and Power: How Two Militia Commanders Came to Shape the Horn of Africa
By Horn of Africa Geopolitical Review Special Report
-KHARTOUM / MEKELLE — In the Horn of Africa, where fragile states often collide with vast natural wealth, two militia leaders have built empires out of conflict and commerce.
In Sudan and Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, and Brigadier General Migbey Haile have emerged as powerful figures whose fortunes and influence extend far beyond the battlefields that made them famous.
Both men rose from humble beginnings one a camel trader in Darfur, the other a farmer and church deacon in Tigray to command armed forces that now rival their countries’ formal militaries in wealth and reach. Both have also been accused of using their control over gold and other resources to consolidate power and enrich themselves while their regions descended into humanitarian crises.
From Camel Trader to Kingmaker
Hemedti’s ascent began in the deserts of western Sudan. A member of the Rizeigat Arab clan, he left school early to trade livestock before joining the Janjaweed militias that fought in Darfur in the early 2000s. As the conflict evolved, he became commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group accused by rights groups of widespread abuses.
His family-run company, al-Junaid, grew into one of Sudan’s largest private gold exporters, operating mines in Darfur and reportedly selling through Dubai. Western and Sudanese analysts say Hemedti leveraged his control of gold to build a parallel economy and to forge ties with foreign players notably in the United Arab Emirates and with Russia’s Wagner Group.
After the ousting of longtime ruler Omar al-Bashir in 2019, Hemedti was appointed deputy head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, making him one of the most powerful men in the country. His RSF later clashed with the Sudanese army in a devastating war that has displaced millions.
The Tigrayan Connection
Across the border in Ethiopia, Migbey Haile rose through the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the former rebel movement that dominated Ethiopian politics for nearly three decades. Born in the rural Zana district, Migbey reportedly joined the TPLF as a young fighter, later serving as a regional security official and military officer.
Since the Tigray conflict erupted in 2020, Migbey has been linked by local sources and opposition figures to illicit mining operations and alleged corruption within Tigray’s gold sector. Reports claim that gold extracted from Tigray was funneled through informal routes to foreign markets, with proceeds invested in real estate in Dubai and other overseas assets.
Independent verification of these claims remains limited, but they echo broader concerns over the militarization of natural resources in post-war Tigray.
Gold and the Geopolitics of Survival
Both Hemedti and Migbey exemplify how resource wealth has become entwined with power politics in the Horn of Africa. In regions where state institutions are weak and armed groups dominate local economies, gold and other commodities often serve as a source of both survival and influence.
“The concentration of economic and military power in the hands of militia leaders has blurred the line between the state and private enterprise,” says one regional analyst. “It creates a cycle where conflict sustains wealth, and wealth sustains conflict.”
For Sudan and Ethiopia alike, that cycle has proven hard to break. Gold, once seen as a potential driver of development, has instead become a contested asset fueling rivalries and prolonging instability.
Both men remain pivotal and controversial figures in their regions. Hemedti’s RSF continues to wield military and financial power despite Sudan’s deepening civil war. In Tigray, Migbey’s influence reflects the lingering dominance of ex-fighters in a region still struggling to recover from two years of conflict.
The Legacy of Militia Power
The stories of Hemedti and Migbey reveal a recurring dilemma in the Horn of Africa: when liberation movements evolve into economic networks, accountability and governance often lag behind. Their rise underscores how control over natural resources rather than ideology or institution-building increasingly defines power in the region.
As Sudan and Ethiopia confront the twin challenges of reconstruction and reconciliation, the question remains whether figures forged in war can adapt to peace or whether the region’s politics will remain hostage to its war economies.
Editor’s Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in articles published by Horn News Hub are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or editorial stance of Horn News Hub. Publication does not imply endorsement.
