Mekelle/Tel Aviv/Nairobi/Pretoria/London
Ethiopia’s Red Sea Ambitions Stir Old Memories and New Tensions
Addis Ababa sees maritime access as an economic lifeline. Neighbours weigh sovereignty and security.
By Rass Tesema Nadow
ADDIS ABABA – Ethiopia’s leaders are reviving calls for secure access to the Red Sea, invoking centuries of history and international law to argue that the country’s future prosperity depends on regaining a maritime outlet. The campaign, framed as peaceful and mutually beneficial, comes at a moment of shifting alliances and fragile stability across the Horn of Africa.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and senior officials have repeatedly described sea access as a “natural right” and an “existential” need for Africa’s second-most populous nation. Landlocked since Eritrea’s secession in 1993, Ethiopia now channels more than 90% of its trade through Djibouti’s ports, a dependence that officials say leaves its 120-million citizens vulnerable to price shocks and political pressure.
History and the weight of geography
Ethiopia’s connection to the Red Sea reaches back to antiquity. The ancient port of Adulis, once part of the Aksumite empire, was a hub of trade linking the highlands to Arabia and the wider Indian Ocean world. Later Ethiopian rulers periodically asserted influence over coastal areas, but the modern map was fixed after Eritrea’s independence referendum, which Addis Ababa accepted under international supervision.
Yet memories of more recent control over the coast remain vivid. A video circulating on Ethiopian social media shows Emperor Haile Selassie inaugurating the port of Assab on 3 December 1961, underscoring that Ethiopia maintained direct maritime facilities well into the modern era. The military Derg regime that overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974 continued to expand and develop Assab, regarding it as a national strategic asset.
Critics today point to the 1993 independence process—when the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated Ethiopia’s transitional government—as the moment the country lost Assab. They argue the TPLF leadership effectively “gave away” the port to Eritrean leader Isaias Afwerki and the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) without securing Ethiopian public consent. No nationwide referendum was held specifically on the future of Assab, a fact Ethiopian scholars and commentators now highlight as evidence of what they call a historical miscalculation or even a political conspiracy.
“Assab was more than a port; it was Ethiopia’s economic lung,” says an Addis Ababa university historian. “The people were never asked. The decision was made by elites in a time of upheaval.” TPLF officials have long maintained that the Eritrean referendum and Ethiopia’s recognition of the result followed international norms and that retaining Assab without Eritrea would have been untenable after decades of armed struggle.
The law and the limits of access
Despite the emotional weight of history, contemporary international law recognises current borders as definitive. “Historical association does not confer a legal claim to territory,” says a regional legal scholar based in Nairobi. “What Ethiopia is entitled to is access for trade, not sovereignty over a port.”
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea grants landlocked states the right of transit to and from the sea through neighbouring countries. In practice, this means negotiating port leases, transit corridors and customs regimes. It does not grant maritime zones or the right to build naval bases without the host state’s consent.
Neighbours and power plays
Each coastal neighbour brings opportunity and risk.
- Djibouti remains Ethiopia’s main gateway and a vital source of revenue for the small port state. Djiboutian officials welcome Ethiopia’s trade but resist any arrangement that could dilute their monopoly.
- Eritrea, with the deep-water ports of Assab and Massawa, offers the shortest and most logical route, but decades of hostility and intermittent détente make political trust elusive.
- Sudan and its Port Sudan corridor could provide redundancy, but civil war has made logistics hazardous.
- Somalia/Somaliland presents a cheaper route through Berbera, but unresolved sovereignty disputes carry legal and diplomatic risks.
External powers add another layer. Gulf states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia have invested heavily in Horn ports, viewing the Red Sea as a strategic artery. Egypt, although not directly involved in Ethiopia’s maritime search, monitors the region through the prism of Nile politics and fears any shift that could strengthen Addis Ababa’s regional clout.
Economics and urgency
The economic rationale is clear. Ethiopia has sustained rapid growth for two decades, building industrial parks and export zones that rely on predictable logistics. Transport costs through Djibouti can account for more than 20% of the value of some exports. Diversifying routes could lower costs, reduce congestion and attract investors wary of single-corridor risk.
“Ethiopia’s size makes dependence on one corridor unsustainable,” says an Addis-based trade economist. “But diversification requires diplomacy as much as infrastructure. Every alternative port comes with a political price.”
A revived national debate
Abiy’s recent speeches questioning Ethiopia’s loss of Assab and calling for “fair and legal access” to the sea have reignited debate inside Ethiopia over past leadership decisions. Scholars, opposition figures and nationalist commentators frame the question as unfinished business from the 1990s, while government officials insist they seek economic arrangements, not territorial revision.
The prime minister has so far emphasised negotiation over confrontation. “Our goal is not to infringe on the sovereignty of others,” he told parliament earlier this year. “But a country of over 120 million cannot remain forever without secure access to the sea.”
Paths forward
Analysts point to a menu of options: long-term port leases, joint ventures in special economic zones, and regional transit treaties that streamline customs and dispute resolution. All require the consent of neighbouring states and adherence to international norms on territorial integrity.
The most plausible scenario, experts say, is a multi-corridor strategy that keeps Djibouti as the primary gateway while developing secondary routes through Berbera, Port Sudan or Eritrean ports if relations improve. Such arrangements could be financed through Gulf investment and African Union frameworks to reduce fears of dominance.
Stakes for the region
Handled carefully, Ethiopia’s maritime quest could lower costs for its neighbours, spur cross-border trade and encourage cooperation in one of the world’s most volatile regions. Mishandled, it risks inflaming sovereignty disputes and inviting external intervention.
For now, the Red Sea remains tantalisingly close but politically distant. Ethiopia’s leaders insist their goal is economic survival, not territorial revision. Their neighbours, wary of precedent, will judge those intentions by the fine print of any deal—and by the lessons of Assab’s contested past.
